Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/104573
Authors: 
Güth, Werner
Levati, M. Vittoria
Nardi, Chiara
Soraperra, Ivan
Year of Publication: 
2014
Series/Report no.: 
Jena Economic Research Papers 2014-018
Abstract: 
We enrich the choice task of responders in ultimatum games by allowing them to independently decide whether to collect what is offered to them and whether to destroy what the proposer demanded. Such a multidimensional response format intends to cast further light on the motives guiding responder behavior. Using a conservative and strin- gent approach to type classification, we find that the overwhelming majority of responder participants choose consistently with outcome-based preference models. There are, however, few responders that destroy the proposer´s demand of a large pie share and concurrently reject their own offer, thereby suggesting a strong concern for integrity.
Subjects: 
experiments
incomplete information
social preferences
ultimatum
JEL: 
C72
C91
D63
D74
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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