Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/104568
Authors: 
Güth, Werner
Levati, M. Vittoria
Montinari, Natalia
Nardi, Chiara
Year of Publication: 
2014
Series/Report no.: 
Jena Economic Research Papers 2014-015
Abstract: 
In the hybrid game, one proposer confronts two responders with veto power: one responder can condition his decisions on his own offer but the other cannot. We vary what the informed responder knows about the offers as well as the uninformed responder´s conflict payoff. Neither variation affects behavior: proposers always favor informed responders, who frequently accept minimal offers.
Subjects: 
Ultimatum
Yes/No game
JEL: 
C72
C92
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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