Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/104492
Authors: 
Sandner, Kai
Year of Publication: 
2008
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion Papers in Business Administration 2008-02
Abstract: 
This paper addresses the question, what metrics should be used for performance evaluation and in particular how they should be weighted and combined in the presence of technological interdependencies when the agents exhibit variedly strong developed rivalry. We find that the principal reacts to his agents' competitive preferences through a reallocation of incentive intensity. As a consequence, depending on the underlying sort of technological interdependency, various differences in the balancing of performance measures compared to the case of purely egoistical behavior arise and changes in the agents' basic types of compensation can occur. We further show that the principal does not want both of his agents to behave equally competitively. Instead, he can only profit when the agents are asymmetrical. Then the principal wants the more productive agent to exhibit rivalry while the other ideally should behave completely egoistically.
Subjects: 
Social Preferences
Rivalry
Technological Interdependencies
Performance Measurement
Team Composition
JEL: 
D23
D82
D86
M41
M52
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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