Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/104459 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2006
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Discussion Paper No. 2006-02
Verlag: 
Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, Fakultät für Betriebswirtschaft, München
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper looks at markets characterized by the fact that the demand side is insured. In these markets a consumer purchases a good to compensate consequen¬ces of unfavorable events, such as an accident or an illness. Insurance policies in most lines of insurance base indemnity on the insured’s actual expenses, i.e., the insured would be partially or completely reimbursed when purchasing certain goods. In this setting we discuss the interaction between insurance and repair markets by focusing, on the one hand, upon the development of prices and the structure of markets with insured consumers, and, on the other hand, the resulting backlash on optimal insurance contracting. We show that even in the absence of ex post moral hazard the extension of insurance coverage will lead to an increase in prices as well as to a socially undesirable increase in the number of repair service suppliers, if repair markets are imperfect.
Schlagwörter: 
insurance
incomplete contracts
repair markets
JEL: 
C72
D43
G22
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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