Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/104428
Authors: 
Siegert, Caspar
Year of Publication: 
2014
Series/Report no.: 
Munich Discussion Paper 2014-22
Abstract: 
We analyze the incentives for information disclosure in financial markets. We show that borrowers may have incentives to voluntarily withhold information and that doing so is most attractive for claims that are inherently hard to value, such as portfolios of subprime mortgages. Interestingly, opacity may be optimal even though it increases informational asymmetries between contracting parties. Finally, in our setting a government can intervene in ways that ensure the liquidity of financial markets and that resemble the initial plans for TARP. Even if such interventions are ex-post optimal, they affect incentives for information disclosure and have ambiguous ex-ante effects.
Subjects: 
Information Acquisition
Adverse Selection
Allocative Efficiency
Opacity
JEL: 
D82
G21
G32
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.