Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/104379 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2012
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Munich Discussion Paper No. 2012-17
Verlag: 
Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, München
Zusammenfassung: 
The outcome of non-binding reverse auctions critically depends on how information is distributed during the bidding process. We use data from a large European procurement platform to study the impact of different information structures, specifically the availability of quality information to the bidders, on buyers' welfare and turnover of the platform. First we show that on the procurement platform considered bidders indeed are aware of their rivals' characteristics and the buyers preferences over those non-price characteristics. In a counterfactual analysis we then analyze the reduction of non-price information available to the bidders. As we find, platform turnovers in the period considered would decrease by around 30%, and the buyers' welfare would increase by the monetary equivalent of around 45% of turnover of the platform.
Schlagwörter: 
Procurement
Bidding
Reverse Auctions
Multi-Attribute Auctions
Non-Binding Auctions
Information Disclosure
Structural Estimation
JEL: 
D44
D82
L11
L15
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
762.97 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.