Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/104379
Authors: 
Stoll, Sebastian
Zöttl, Gregor
Year of Publication: 
2012
Series/Report no.: 
Munich Discussion Paper 2012-17
Abstract: 
The outcome of non-binding reverse auctions critically depends on how information is distributed during the bidding process. We use data from a large European procurement platform to study the impact of different information structures, specifically the availability of quality information to the bidders, on buyers' welfare and turnover of the platform. First we show that on the procurement platform considered bidders indeed are aware of their rivals' characteristics and the buyers preferences over those non-price characteristics. In a counterfactual analysis we then analyze the reduction of non-price information available to the bidders. As we find, platform turnovers in the period considered would decrease by around 30%, and the buyers' welfare would increase by the monetary equivalent of around 45% of turnover of the platform.
Subjects: 
Procurement
Bidding
Reverse Auctions
Multi-Attribute Auctions
Non-Binding Auctions
Information Disclosure
Structural Estimation
JEL: 
D44
D82
L11
L15
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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