Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/104363 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2012
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Munich Discussion Paper No. 2012-3
Verlag: 
Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, München
Zusammenfassung: 
We develop a model relating self-control, risk preferences and conflict identification to cooperation patterns in social dilemmas. We subject our model to data from an experimental public goods game and a risk experiment, and we measure conflict identification and self-control. As predicted, we find a robust association between self-control and higher levels of cooperation, and the association is weaker for more risk-averse individuals. Free riders differ from other contributor types only in their tendency not to have identified a self-control conflict in the first place. Our model accounts for the data at least as well as do other models.
Schlagwörter: 
self-control
cooperation
public good
risk
experiment
JEL: 
C91
D03
H40
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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