Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/104353
Authors: 
Ludwig, Sandra
Wichardt, Philip C.
Wickhorst, Hanke
Year of Publication: 
2011
Series/Report no.: 
Munich Discussion Paper 2011-11
Abstract: 
In this paper, we study the individual payoff effects of overconfident self-perception in teams. In particular, we demonstrate that the welfare of an overconfident agent in a team of one rational and one overconfident agent or a team of two overconfident agents can be higher than that of the members of a team of two rational agents. This result holds irrespective of the assumption about the agents' awareness of their colleague's bias. Moreover, we show that an overcondent agent is always better of when he is unaware of a potential bias of his colleague.
Subjects: 
Overconfidence
Team Production
JEL: 
D21
D62
L23
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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