Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/104333
Authors: 
Ludwig, Sandra
Year of Publication: 
2011
Series/Report no.: 
Munich Discussion Paper 2011-6
Abstract: 
We study a model of imperfectly discriminating contests with two ex ante symmetric agents. We consider four institutional settings: Contestants move either sequentially or simultaneously and in addition their types are either public or private information. We find that an effort-maximizing designer of the contest prefers the sequential to the simultaneous setting from an ex ante perspective. Moreover, the sequential contest Pareto dominates the simultaneous one when the contestants’ types are sufficiently negatively correlated. Regarding the information structure, the designer ex ante prefers private information while the contestants prefer public information.
Subjects: 
sequential contests
asymmetric information
rent-seeking
JEL: 
D72
C72
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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