Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/104303
Year of Publication: 
2010
Series/Report no.: 
Munich Discussion Paper No. 2010-35
Publisher: 
Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, München
Abstract: 
This paper suggests a potential rationale for the recent empirical finding that overconfident agents tend to self-select into more competitive environments (e.g. Dohmen and Falk, forthcoming). In particular, it shows that moderate overconfidence in a contest can improve the agent's performance relative to an unbiased opponent and can even lead to an advantage for the overconfident agent in absolute terms.
Subjects: 
Overconfidence
Contests
JEL: 
D21
D44
D82
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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