Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/104300 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2010
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Munich Discussion Paper No. 2010-17
Verlag: 
Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, München
Zusammenfassung: 
In this paper we focus on the compliance effects of tax regime changes. According to the economic model of tax evasion, a tax reform should affect compliance through its impact on tax rates and incentives. Our findings demonstrate the importance of at least two further effects not covered by the traditional model: First, reform losers tend to evade more taxes after the reform. Second, a reform from a proportionate to a progressive system decreases compliance compared to a switch in the reverse direction. However, the level of compliance is generally higher under a progressive than under a proportionate regime.
Schlagwörter: 
tax reforms
tax compliance
experiment
JEL: 
C72
C91
H26
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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