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Autoren: 
Bauer, Christian
Lingens, Jörg
Datum: 
2009
Reihe/Nr.: 
Munich Discussion Paper 2009-7
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper analyzes the welfare effects of a public smoking ban in bars. We construct a model that captures crucial features of bar life: competing bars, social interaction, and heterogenous preferences for a smoking ban. Smokers and non-smokers simultaneously choose a bar given their preferences for meeting other people. Bars anticipate the behavior of individuals and choose the smoking regime strategically. Since the (dis)utility from smoking and social interaction are substitutes, the smoking regime is a stronger coordination device if the disutility from smoking is large. If all bars allow smoking in equilibrium, a public smoking ban enhances welfare.
Schlagwörter: 
Smoking Ban
Social Interaction
Coordination Game
JEL: 
L13
I18
D61
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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