Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/104288
Authors: 
Schlicht, Ekkehart
Year of Publication: 
2009
Series/Report no.: 
Munich Discussion Paper 2009-14
Abstract: 
Applicants for any given job are more or less suited to fill it, and the firm will select the best among them. Increasing the wage offer attracts more applicants and makes it possible to raise the hiring standard and improve the productivity of the staff. Wages that optimize on the trade-off between the wage level and the productivity of the workforce are known as selection wages. As men react more strongly to wage differentials than females, the trade-off is more pronounced for men and a profit-maximizing firm will offer a higher wage for men than for women in equilibrium.
Subjects: 
Discrimination
selection wages
efficiency wages
hiring standards
monopsony
employment criteria
wage posting
Reder competition
social roles
social stereotypes
social multiplier
statistical discrimination
taste discrimination
JEL: 
J31
J7
B54
D13
D42
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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