Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/104285
Authors: 
Klein, Joachim
Zenger, Hans
Year of Publication: 
2009
Series/Report no.: 
Munich Discussion Paper 2009-9
Abstract: 
While the previous literature on exclusive dealing has been concerned with the question of how exclusive dealing can raise static profits, this paper analyzes the question of how exclusive dealing can be used to predate in a dynamic context. It is shown that exclusive dealing may arise even if it reduces static profits. Exclusivity provisions may not only allow excluding efficient competitors, but indeed are often a cheaper exclusionary tool than predatory pricing. This is the case if the prey's access to finance is not too limited. Furthermore, it is more likely that exclusive dealing is preferable compared to predatory pricing the more market power the predator has with respect to the prey.
Subjects: 
exclusive dealing
predation
JEL: 
K21
L11
L12
L41
L42
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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