Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/104284
Authors: 
Strassmair, Christina
Year of Publication: 
2009
Series/Report no.: 
Munich Discussion Paper 2009-4
Abstract: 
Consider a situation where person A undertakes a costly action that benefits person B. This behavior seems altruistic. However, if A expects a reward in return from B, then A's action may be motivated by the expected rewards rather than by pure altruism. The question we address in this experimental study is how B reacts to the intentions of A. We vary the probability, with which the second mover in a trust game can reciprocate, and analyze effects on second mover behavior. Our results suggest that the perceived kindness and its rewards are not spoiled by expected rewards.
Subjects: 
social preferences
intentions
beliefs
psychological game theory
experiment
JEL: 
D02
C91
D64
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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