Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/104281
Authors: 
Farbmacher, Helmut
Year of Publication: 
2009
Series/Report no.: 
Munich Discussion Paper 2009-10
Abstract: 
The German health care reform of 2004 imposes a charge of 10 Euro for the first visit to a doctor in each quarter of the year. At first glance, there is no inhibiting effect of this fee on utilization in the German Socio-Economic Panel. However, this study reveals that the true effect is diluted by a special characteristic of the fee. Exploiting random variation in the interview date, this study finds a substantial effect of the new fee on the probability of visiting a physician. In addition, the identification strategy makes it possible to disentangle this effect from the influence of the contemporaneous increase of copayments for prescription drugs.
Subjects: 
copayment
moral hazard
differences-in-differences
JEL: 
I18
I11
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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