Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/104211
Authors: 
Schmidtke, Richard
Year of Publication: 
2006
Series/Report no.: 
Munich Discussion Paper 2006-20
Abstract: 
For several years, an increasing number of firms are investing in Open Source Software (OSS). While improvements in such a non-excludable public good cannot be appropriated, companies can benefit indirectly in a complementary proprietary segment. We study this incentive for investment in OSS. In particular we ask how (1) market entry and (2) public investments in the public good affects the firms' production and profits. Surprisingly, we find that there exist cases where incumbents benefit from market entry. Moreover, we show the counter-intuitive result that public spending does not necessarily lead to a decreasing voluntary private contribution.
Subjects: 
Open Source Software
Private Provision of Public Goods
Cournot-Nash Equilibrium
Complements
Market Entry
JEL: 
C72
L13
L86
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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