Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/104205 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2006
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Munich Discussion Paper No. 2006-4
Verlag: 
Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, München
Zusammenfassung: 
We formulate a model to explain why the lack of political competition may stifle economic performance and use the United States as a testing ground for the model’s predictions, exploiting the 1965 Voting Rights Act which helped break the near monpoly on political power of the Democrats in southern states. We find statistically robust evidence that changes in political competition have quantitatively important effects on state income growth, state policies, and quality of Governors. By our bottom-line estimate, the increase in political competition triggered by the Voting Rights Act raised long-run per capita income in the average affected state by about 20 percent.
Schlagwörter: 
US south
voting restrictions
political competition
economic growth
JEL: 
D72
H11
H70
N12
O11
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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