Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/104185 
Year of Publication: 
2006
Series/Report no.: 
Munich Discussion Paper No. 2006-37
Publisher: 
Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, München
Abstract: 
Offering higher wages may enable firms to attract more applicants and screen them more carefully. If firms compete in this way in the labor market, "selection wages" emerge. This note illustrates this wage-setting mechanism. Selection wages may engender unconventional results, such as a pre-tax wage compression induced by the introduction of a progressive wage tax.
Subjects: 
wage formation
efficiency wage
incentive wage
mobility
job-specific pay
wage-tax
JEL: 
J31
J41
J62
J63
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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