Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/104172 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2005
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Munich Discussion Paper No. 2005-14
Verlag: 
Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, München
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper considers a firm whose potential employees have private information on both their productivity and the extent of their fairness concerns. Fairness is modelled as inequity aversion, where fair-minded workers suffer if their colleagues get more income net of production costs. Screening workers with equal productivity but different fairness concerns is shown to be impossible if both types are to be employed, thereby rendering the optimal employment contracts discontinuous in the fraction of fair-minded workers. As a result, fairness might infuence the employment contracts of all workers although only some are fair-minded, and identical firms facing very similar pools of workers might employ very different remuneration schemes.
Schlagwörter: 
Fairness
Employment Contracts
Adverse Selection
Screening
Heterogeneity in Organizational Form
JEL: 
C70
D21
D42
D63
D82
J31
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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