Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/104142 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2004
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Munich Discussion Paper No. 2004-19
Verlag: 
Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, München
Zusammenfassung: 
In transition and developing countries, we observe rather high levels of corruption even if they have democratic political systems. This is surprising from a political economy perspective, as the majority of people generally suffers from high corruption levels. Our model is based on the fact that corrupt officials have to pay an entry fee to get lucrative positions. In a probabilistic voting model, we show that a lack of financial institutions can lead to more corruption as more voters become part of the corrupt system. Well-functioning financial institutions, in turn, can increase the political support for anti-corruption measures.
Schlagwörter: 
Corruption
Financial Markets
Institutions
Development
Voting
JEL: 
D73
D72
O17
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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