Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/104131 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2004
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Munich Discussion Paper No. 2004-1
Verlag: 
Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, München
Zusammenfassung: 
International organizations promote privatization as precondition for economic development. But is there really too little privatization? This political economy model asks for the incentives of governments to privatize or restructure a state-owned firm. Different government types are compared to identify the political and institutional determinants of privatization. Under privatization, governments commit not to influence the profit-maximizing employment choice by private investors. With respect to the social optimum, both voter-oriented and egoistic governments can have inefficiently high incentives to privatize. When this is the case, outside pressure to privatize is detrimental. An improving institutional environment reduces these inefficiencies.
Schlagwörter: 
political incentives
privatization
restructuring
employment
JEL: 
D72
D73
H82
L33
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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