Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/104121
Authors: 
Herold, Florian
Year of Publication: 
2003
Series/Report no.: 
Munich Discussion Paper 2003-5
Abstract: 
This paper studies the evolution of both characteristics of reciprocity - the willingness to reward friendly behavior and the willingness to punish hostile behavior. Firstly, preferences for rewarding as well as preferences for punishing can survive evolution provided individuals interact within separated groups. This holds even with randomly formed groups and even when individual preferences are unobservable. Secondly, preferences for rewarding survive only in coexistence with self-interested preferences. But preferences for punishing tend either to vanish or to dominate the population entirely. Finally, the evolution of preferences for rewarding and the evolution of preferences for punishing influence each other decisively. The existence of rewarders enhances the evolutionary success of punishers, but punishers crowd out rewarders.
Subjects: 
Reciprocity
Evolution of Preferences
Group Selection
Coevolution
Fairness
JEL: 
C72
D63
D64
D83
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.