Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/104083 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2001
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Munich Discussion Paper No. 2001-7
Verlag: 
Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, München
Zusammenfassung: 
We show that concerns for fairness may have dramatic consequences for the optimal provision of incentives in a moral hazard context. Incentive contracts that are optimal when there are only selfish actors become inferior when some agents are concerned about fairness. Conversely, contracts that are doomed to fail when there are only selfish actors provide powerful incentives and become superior when there are also fair-minded players. These predictions are strongly supported by the results of a series of experiments. Furthermore, our results suggest that the existence of fair actors may be an important reason why many contracts are left deliberately incomplete.
Schlagwörter: 
Incentive Contracts
Moral Hazard
Fairness
Reciprocity
Incomplete Contracts
JEL: 
C7
C9
J3
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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