Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/103981
Authors: 
Bergh, Andreas
Wichardt, Philipp
Year of Publication: 
2014
Series/Report no.: 
Kiel Working Paper 1971
Abstract: 
This paper proposes a simple framework to model social preferences in a game theoretic framework which explicitly separates economic incentives from social (context) effects. It is argued that such a perspective makes it easier to analyse contextual effects. Moreover, the framework is used to exemplify both theoretically and empirically how contextual variables such as social norms can worsen a social dilemma or possibly make it disappear. The empirical results of a randomised controlled classroom experiment show that women are more responsive to such contextual effects and that social agreements can also worsen economic inefficiencies.
Subjects: 
Context Effects
Efficiency
Social Norms
Social Preferences
Utility
JEL: 
D03
D63
Z10
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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