Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/103917
Authors: 
Herzberg, Frederik
Year of Publication: 
2014
Series/Report no.: 
Working Papers, Center for Mathematical Economics 513
Abstract: 
Amartya Sen (1970) has shown that three natural desiderata for social choice rules are inconsistent: universal domain, respect for unanimity, and respect for some minimal rights - which can be interpreted as either expert rights or liberal rights. Dietrich and List (2008) have generalised this result to the setting of binary judgement aggregation. This paper proves that the liberal paradox holds even in the framework of probabilistic opinion pooling and discusses options to circumvent this impossibility result: restricting the aggregator domain to profiles with no potential for conflicting rights, or considering agendas whose issues are not all mutually interdependent.
Subjects: 
probabilistic opinion pooling
Sen's liberal paradox
expert rights
liberal rights
unanimity
general aggregation theory
JEL: 
D71
D82
C11
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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