Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/103848
Authors: 
Blatter, Marc
Sticher, Silvio
Year of Publication: 
2013
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion Papers, Department of Economics, Universität Bern 13-12
Abstract: 
In a setting where retailers and suppliers compete for each other by offering binding contracts, exclusivity clauses serve as a competitive device. As a result of these clauses, firms addressed by contracts only accept the most favorable deal. Thus the contract-issuing parties have to squeeze their final customers and transfer the surplus within the vertical supply chain. We elaborate to what extent the resulting allocation depends on the sequence of play and discuss the implications of a ban on exclusivity clauses.
Subjects: 
exclusive dealing
exclusive provision
JEL: 
D86
L13
L42
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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