Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/103840
Authors: 
Sticher, Silvio
Year of Publication: 
2013
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion Papers, Department of Economics, Universität Bern 13-11
Abstract: 
We discuss a model of a job market where firms announce salaries. Thereupon, they decide through the evaluation of a productivity test whether to hire applicants. Candidates for a job are locked in once they have applied at a given employer. Hence, such a market exhibits a specific form of the bargain-then-ripoff principle. With a single firm, the outcome is efficient. Under competition, what might be called "positive selection" leads to market failure. Thus our model provides a rationale for very small employment probabilities in some sectors.
Subjects: 
directed search
selection
wage posting
JEL: 
D83
J21
J31
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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