Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/103786 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2014
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
SFB 649 Discussion Paper No. 2014-044
Verlag: 
Humboldt University of Berlin, Collaborative Research Center 649 - Economic Risk, Berlin
Zusammenfassung: 
A central issue in climate policy is the question whether long-term targets for green- house gas emissions should be adopted. This paper analyzes strategic effects related to the timing of such commitments. Using a two-country model, we identify a redistributive effect that undermines long-term cooperation when countries are asymmetric and side payments are unavailable. The effect enables countries to shift rents strategically via their R&D efforts under delayed cooperation. In contrast, a complementarity effect stabi- lizes long-term cooperation, because early commitments in abatement induce countries to invest more in low-carbon technologies, and create additional knowledge spillovers. Con- trasting both effects, we endogenize the timing of climate agreements.
Schlagwörter: 
climate treaty
abatement
long-term cooperation
spillover
strategic delay
JEL: 
D62
F53
H23
Q55
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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