Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/103786
Authors: 
Schmidt, Robert C.
Strausz, Roland
Year of Publication: 
2014
Series/Report no.: 
SFB 649 Discussion Paper 2014-044
Abstract: 
A central issue in climate policy is the question whether long-term targets for green- house gas emissions should be adopted. This paper analyzes strategic effects related to the timing of such commitments. Using a two-country model, we identify a redistributive effect that undermines long-term cooperation when countries are asymmetric and side payments are unavailable. The effect enables countries to shift rents strategically via their R&D efforts under delayed cooperation. In contrast, a complementarity effect stabi- lizes long-term cooperation, because early commitments in abatement induce countries to invest more in low-carbon technologies, and create additional knowledge spillovers. Con- trasting both effects, we endogenize the timing of climate agreements.
Subjects: 
climate treaty
abatement
long-term cooperation
spillover
strategic delay
JEL: 
D62
F53
H23
Q55
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
616.62 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.