Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/103651
Autoren: 
Jeitschko, Thomas D.
Tremblay, Mark J.
Datum: 
2014
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
DICE Discussion Paper No. 166
Zusammenfassung: 
We develop a model for two-sided markets with consumers and producers, who interact through a platform. Typical settings for the model are the market for smartphones with phone users, app producers, and smartphone operating systems; or the video game market with game players, video game producers, and video game consoles. Only consumers who purchase the platform can access content from the producers. Consumers are heterogeneous in their gains from the producer side; and producers are heterogeneous in their costs of bringing apps to the platform. We consider competition between two homogeneous platforms that allows consumers and firms to optimize with respect to how they home, i.e. we allow both individual consumers and individual producers to multi-home or single-home depending on whether it is optimal based on their type. This leads to multiple equilibrium allocations of consumers and firms - all of which are seen in existing markets. We then find conditions under which a monopoly platform generates higher surplus than two competing homogeneous platforms.
Schlagwörter: 
two-sided markets
platforms
platform competition
multi-homing
single-homing
endogenous homing decisions
network effects
JEL: 
L14
L22
D40
L13
ISBN: 
978-3-86304-165-6
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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