Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/103616 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2013
Quellenangabe: 
[Journal:] Risks [ISSN:] 2227-9091 [Volume:] 1 [Issue:] 2 [Publisher:] MDPI [Place:] Basel [Year:] 2013 [Pages:] 57-80
Verlag: 
MDPI, Basel
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper presents a welfare analysis of several capital insurance programs in a rational expectation equilibrium setting. We first explicitly characterize the equilibrium of each capital insurance program. Then, we demonstrate that a capital insurance program based on aggregate loss is better than classical insurance, when big financial institutions have similar expected loss exposures. By contrast, classical insurance is more desirable when the bank's individual risk is consistent with the expected loss in a precise way. Our analysis shows that a capital insurance program is a useful tool to hedge systemic risk from the regulatory perspective.
Schlagwörter: 
capital insurance
welfare
equilibrium
JEL: 
G11
G12
G13
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Creative-Commons-Lizenz: 
cc-by Logo
Dokumentart: 
Article
Erscheint in der Sammlung:

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
389.81 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.