Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/103483
Authors: 
Behaghel, Luc
Crépon, Bruno
Le Barbanchon, Thomas
Year of Publication: 
2014
Series/Report no.: 
IZA Discussion Papers 8517
Abstract: 
We evaluate an experimental program in which the French public employment service anonymized resumes for firms that were hiring. Firms were free to participate or not; participating firms were then randomly assigned to receive either anonymous resumes or name-bearing ones. We find that participating firms become less likely to interview and hire minority candidates when receiving anonymous resumes. We show how these unexpected results can be explained by the self-selection of firms into the program and by the fact that anonymization prevents the attenuation of negative signals when the candidate belongs to a minority.
Subjects: 
anonymous applications
discrimination
randomized experiment
JEL: 
J71
J78
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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