Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/103142
Authors: 
Kamecke, Ulrich
Year of Publication: 
2014
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper 4969
Abstract: 
We model centralized school matching as a second stage of a simple Tiebout-model and show that the two most discussed mechanisms, the deferred acceptance and the Boston algorithm, both produce inefficient outcomes and that the Boston mechanism is more efficient than deferred acceptance. This advantage vanishes if the participants get to know their priorities before they submit their preferences. Moreover, the mechanism creates artificial social segregation at the cost of the disadvantaged if the school priorities are based on ex ante known (social) differences of the applicants.
Subjects: 
school choice
deffered acceptance
Boston mechanism
Tiebout-hypothesis
social seggregation
JEL: 
C78
H42
R23
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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