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Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2014
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
cege Discussion Papers No. 219
Verlag: 
University of Göttingen, Center for European, Governance and Economic Development Research (cege), Göttingen
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper applies the indirect evolutionary approach to study the evolution of inequality aversion in a simplified game of life. The game comprises a dilemma, a problem of coordination, and a problem of distribution as a general framework for the evolution of preferences. In singlegame environments, there emerges a global advantage for inequality-averse individuals in the dilemma and a global disadvantage for inequality-averse players who are favoured by the problem of distribution. The simplified game of life puts these strong predictions into perspective. In particular, selfish and inequality-averse individuals may coexist in the subpopulation, favoured in the problem of distribution.
Schlagwörter: 
inequality aversion
evolution
preferences
JEL: 
C72
C73
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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