Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/102946
Authors: 
Müller, Stephan
Year of Publication: 
2014
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion Papers, Center for European Governance and Economic Development Research 219
Abstract: 
This paper applies the indirect evolutionary approach to study the evolution of inequality aversion in a simplified game of life. The game comprises a dilemma, a problem of coordination, and a problem of distribution as a general framework for the evolution of preferences. In singlegame environments, there emerges a global advantage for inequality-averse individuals in the dilemma and a global disadvantage for inequality-averse players who are favoured by the problem of distribution. The simplified game of life puts these strong predictions into perspective. In particular, selfish and inequality-averse individuals may coexist in the subpopulation, favoured in the problem of distribution.
Subjects: 
inequality aversion
evolution
preferences
JEL: 
C72
C73
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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