Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/102643
Authors: 
Keser, Claudia
Markstädter, Andreas
Schmidt, Martin
Schnitzler, Cornelius
Year of Publication: 
2014
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion Papers, Center for European Governance and Economic Development Research 217
Abstract: 
We compare voluntary contributions to the financing of a public good in a symmetric setting to those in asymmetric settings, in which four players have different, randomly allocated endowments. We observe that a weak asymmetry in the endowment distribution leads to the same contribution level as symmetry. Players tend to contribute the same proportion of their respective endowment. In a strongly asymmetric setting, where one player has a higher endowment than the three other players together, we observe significantly lower group contributions than in the other settings. The super-rich player does not contribute significantly more than what the others contribute on average and thus a much lower proportion of the endowment.
Subjects: 
experimental economics
linear public good
income heterogeneity
JEL: 
C92
D63
H41
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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