Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/102636 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2013
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Working Paper No. 2013-5
Verlag: 
Brown University, Department of Economics, Providence, RI
Zusammenfassung: 
We study the evolutionary robustness of strategies in in infinitely repeated prisoners' dilemma games in which players make mistakes with a small probability and are patient. The evolutionary process we consider is given by the replicator dynamics. We show that there are strategies with a uniformly large basin of attraction independent of the size of the population. Moreover, we show that those strategies forgive defections and, assuming that they are symmetric, they cooperate. We provide partial efficiency results for asymmetric strategies.
Dokumentart: 
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