Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/102379
Authors: 
Berwart, Erik
Guidolin, Massimo
Milidonis, Andreas
Year of Publication: 
2013
Series/Report no.: 
Manchester Business School Working Paper 639
Abstract: 
We investigate the lead-lag relationships between issuer- and investor-paid credit rating agencies, in the aftermath of the regulatory reforms undertaken in the U.S. between 2002 and 2006 - including watch list inclusions and outlooks. First, we find that the lead effect of investor-paid over issuer-paid credit rating agencies has weakened: in recent years, causality has turned bi-directional. Second, when changes in outlooks are included, we find evidence of a less conservative behavior by issuer-paid agencies, when compared to their rating behavior. Third, stock prices manifest statistically significant abnormal reactions to downgrades of all agencies; however, abnormal negative returns are significantly higher for investor-paid downgrades. Our results support the hypothesis that when issuer-paid agencies have seen their market power threatened by tighter regulations, they have felt incentives to improve the quality and timeliness of their ratings. However, event studies show that markets still price stocks under the assumption that investor-paid rating actions carry superior information.
Subjects: 
rating agencies
timeliness
issuer-paid agencies
investor-paid business model
NRSRO
JEL: 
G24
G28
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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