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Autor:innen: 
Gallier, Carlo
Reif, Christiane
Römer, Daniel
Datum: 
2014
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
ZEW Discussion Papers No. 14-060
Verlag: 
Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW), Mannheim
Zusammenfassung: 
We investigate the dynamic effects of a charitable lottery and an income tax on donations. The analysis is based on a two-round dictator game with the subject's charity of choice as recipient and additional incentives in the first round only. The immediate effect of a charitable lottery leads to higher contributions and we cannot find substantial crowding out of voluntary contributions in the presence of an income tax. These economic interventions weakly spill-over to the subsequent donation decisions without additional incentives. Our results suggest the presence of consistency seeking behaviour. This is especially true for a subgroup of participants with a rule-based mind-set and our research shows the importance of the subjects' moral framework in the context of dynamic pro-social behaviour.
Schlagwörter: 
charitable giving
laboratory experiment
lottery
tax
voluntary contribution mechanism
JEL: 
C91
D64
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Neuere Version: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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