Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/102236
Authors: 
Gersbach, Hans
Haller, Hans
Year of Publication: 
2014
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper 4947
Abstract: 
We develop a model that combines competitive exchange of private commodities across endogenously formed groups with public good provision and global collective decisions. There is a tension between local and global collective decisions. In particular, we show that group formation and collective decisions on public goods may destabilize each other, even if there exist favorable conditions for matching on the one hand, and for global collective decisions on the other hand. We establish sufficient conditions for the existence of competitive equilibria with endogenous household formation and public choice.
Subjects: 
household formation
matching
general equilibrium
public goods
public choice
median voter theorem
JEL: 
D10
D51
D62
D70
H20
H41
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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