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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2014
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 4818
Verlag: 
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Zusammenfassung: 
Twenty years of negotiations over reform of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) are yet to bear fruit. We use recent advances in the theory of a-priori voting power to present a formal quantitative appraisal of the structural reforms contained within eleven current reform proposals, and the separate effect of expansion of the UNSC membership. Only two reform proposals - the EU acting as a single entity, or a weakening of the veto power for permanent members - robustly dominate the status quo against our measures of equity and efficiency. Several proposals may actually worsen the issues they ostensibly claim to resolve.
Schlagwörter: 
United Nations
United Nations Security Council
United Nations Security Council reform
equity
efficiency
voting power
square-root rule
JEL: 
D72
D71
C71
C63
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper
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