Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/102214
Authors: 
Bouchard St-Amant, Pier-André
Garon, Jean-Denis
Year of Publication: 
2014
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper 4937
Abstract: 
We examine how the introduction of self-control preferences influences the trade-off between two fundamental components of a public pension system: the contribution rate and its degree of redistribution. The pension regime affects individuals' welfare by altering how yielding to temptation (i.e. not saving, or saving less) is attractive. We show that proportional taxation increases the cost of self-control, and that this adverse effect is more acute when public pensions become more redistributive.
Subjects: 
taxation
redistribution
pensions
self-control
JEL: 
H55
H21
D03
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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