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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2014
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 4813
Verlag: 
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Zusammenfassung: 
We investigate a case of political favoritism. Some members of the Bavarian parliament hired relatives as office employees who were paid using taxpayers' money. We examine whether being involved in the scandal influenced re-election prospects and voter turnout. The results do not show that being involved in the scandal influenced the outcome and voter turnout of the 2013 state elections. We propose three explanations: (i) the Bavarian state election was a test run for the German federal election; (ii) the state government made a quite good job of clarifying failings; (iii) in June 2013, a very heavy bout of flooding eclipsed the political scandal.
Schlagwörter: 
political scandal
favoritism
nepotism
re-election prospects
voter turnout
JEL: 
D72
H70
A13
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper
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