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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2014
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 4920
Verlag: 
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper analyses bargaining over an incentive compatible contract in a moral hazard framework. We introduce the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution and compare the outcome with the commonly applied Nash solution. Whether worker's effort is higher in the Nash or the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution depends on the agents. bargaining power. If agents have equal bargaining power, the contract in the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution yields a more efficient outcome and induces more effort. The social planner can mitigate inefficiencies arising in both bargaining solutions from the moral hazard problem and even achieve the first-best outcome by allocating the agents' bargaining power. If raising the worker's bargaining power is necessary to achieve the first-best solution, this increase must be higher in the Nash solution than in the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution.
Schlagwörter: 
incentive contracts
moral hazard
Nash bargaining solution
Kalai-Smorodinsky solution
bargaining power
JEL: 
C71
D82
J41
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper
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