Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/102197
Authors: 
Mahajne, Muhammad
Nitzan, Shmuel
Volij, Oscar
Year of Publication: 
2014
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper 4808
Abstract: 
We propose the concept of level r consensus as a useful property of a preference profile which considerably enhances the stability of social choice. This concept involves a weakening of unanimity, the most extreme form of consensus. It is shown that if a preference profile exhibits level r consensus around a given preference relation, the associated majority relation is transitive. In addition, the majority relation coincides with the preference relation around which there is such consensus. Furthermore, if the level of consensus is sufficiently strong, the Condorcet winner is chosen by all the scoring rules. Level r consensus therefore ensures the Condorcet consistency of all scoring rules, thus eliminating the tension between decision rules inspired by ranking-based utilitarianism and the majority rule.
Subjects: 
social choice
unanimity
consensus
preference aggregation rules
transitivity
simple majority
scoring rules
invariance to rule selection
JEL: 
D71
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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