Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/102181
Authors: 
Dufwenberg, Martin
Köhlin, Gunnar
Martinsson, Peter
Medhin, Haileselassie
Year of Publication: 
2014
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper 4864
Abstract: 
Land conflicts in developing countries are costly. An important policy goal is to create respect for borders. This often involves mandatory, expensive interventions. We propose a new policy design, which in theory promotes neighborly relations at low cost. A salient feature is the option to by-pass regulation through consensus. The key idea combines the insight that social preferences transform social dilemmas into coordination problems with the logic of forward induction. As a first, low-cost pass at empirical evaluation, we conduct an experiment among farmers in the Ethiopian highlands, a region exhibiting features typical of countries where borders are often disputed. Our results suggest that a low-cost land delimitation based on neighborly recognition of borders could deliver a desired low-conflict situation if accompanied by an optional higher cost demarcation process.
Subjects: 
conflict
land-conflict game
social preferences
forward induction
Ethiopia
experiment
land reform
JEL: 
C78
C93
D63
Q15
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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