Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/102169
Authors: 
Ogilvie, Sheilagh
Carus, A. W.
Year of Publication: 
2014
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper 4861
Abstract: 
This is Part 1 of a two-part paper which surveys the historical evidence on the role of institutions in economic growth. The paper provides a critical scrutiny of a number of stylized facts widely accepted in the growth literature. It shows that private-order institutions have not historically substituted for public-order ones in enabling markets to function; that parliaments representing wealth holders have not invariably been favourable for growth; and that the Glorious Revolution of 1688 did not mark the sudden emergence of either secure property rights or economic growth. Economic history has been used to support both the centrality and the irrelevance of secure property rights to growth, but the reason for this is conceptual vagueness. Secure property rights require much more careful analysis, distinguishing between rights of ownership, use and transfer, and between generalized and particularized variants. Similar careful analysis would, we argue, clarify the growth effects of other institutions, including contract-enforcement mechanisms, guilds, communities, serfdom, and the family. Greater precision concerning institutional effects on growth can be achieved by developing sharper criteria of application for conventional institutional labels, endowing institutions with a scale of intensity or degree, and recognizing that the effects of each institution depend on its relationship with other components of the wider institutional system. Part 1 of the paper discusses public-order institutions, parliaments, the distinction between generalized and particularized institutions, and property rights.
Subjects: 
institutions
economic growth
economic history
private-order institutions
public-order institutions
parliaments
property rights
contract enforcement
guilds
serfdom
the family
Maghribi traders
Champagne fairs
European Marriage Pattern
JEL: 
N01
N30
N40
N50
N70
O17
P00
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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