Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/102153 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2014
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 4956
Verlag: 
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Zusammenfassung: 
This study proposes an analytical framework towards behavioral political economy of institutional change. It considers institutional changes as central government's choices under uncertainty, which are largely driven by the strategic outcomes in a behavioral coordination game between local officials and private businessmen. With field facts in China, this study suggests that institutional changes begin with pro-competition policies, then a better protection of property rights, followed by a possible standstill or even worse rule of law.
Schlagwörter: 
behavioral economics
China
institutional change
political economy
JEL: 
D03
D70
O43
P26
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper
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